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T.A. Cavanaugh, Philosophy, University of San Francisco
Penultimate draft of: The Nazi! Accusation and Current U.S. Proposals,
Bioethics, 11, Nos. 3-4, July 1997, pp. 291-297.

THE NAZI! ACCUSATION AND CURRENT U.S. PROPOSALS

In discussing the relevance of Nazi “euthanasia” to the practices of
physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and voluntary active euthanasia (VAE),
currently proposed for legalization in the U.S., there are at least two reasons
for putting scare quotes around ‘euthanasia’ when referring to the Nazi
practice of killing, amongst others, the mentally ill, the handicapped,
epileptics, and certain children and infants.i First, to call what contemporary
advocates of physician-assisted suicide (PAS) and voluntary active euthanasia
(VAE) propose Nazi! is hyperbolic. Second, it is an ad hominem, the very
weakest of arguments, indeed, perhaps no argument at all. Calling people and
practices names is odious and futile; for to say that PAS and VAE are or will
become equivalent to what the Nazis did is not to offer reasons against either
practice. Indeed, to call the German “euthanasia” program Nazi! is not to
argue even against that program, for those killings were not wrong merely
because Nazis did the killing.ii
Late Twentieth Century ethical discourse has relied on the Nazis to
exemplify the category of the absolutely wrong with too little reflection on the
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circumstances that lead to this rhetorical strategy. Nazis serve as a convenient
prop to be dusted off and pointed to by those speaking in a society permeated
by emotivism, the position that ethical discourse is constituted entirely of
assertions and counter-assertions of taste. Since contemporary disputants do
not agree about the substantive points and first principles from which ethical
reasoning begins they find it difficult to achieve closure.iii Those who rely on
the Nazi! accusation assume or hope that everyone agrees that the Nazi killing
practices are always and everywhere wrong. Thus, instead of being forced to
sit in perpetual sackcloth and ashes, Nazis putatively function as the one point
of agreement from which public ethical argument can depart confidently. This
idol of the forum is wobbling precariously, however, as those who teach ethics
realize. Students lack confidence that they can establish, nor is there reason to
think that they have been provisioned with the resources to argue, that what
the Nazis did was absolutely, transculturally, everywhere and at every time
wrong. Their lack of confidence reflects one popularly accepted emotivist
position: that disagreement is shrill and interminable because ethical matters
do not admit of truth. Indeed, the phenomenon of the Nazi! charge reflects
despair precisely in the face of the conviction that there are no ethical truths.
Interlocutors are reduced to assertion and counter-assertion, one making and
the other denying the accusation. The Nazi! accusation -- used in divergent
ways by myriad parties -- should be understood as an ethical cri de cœur of
interlocutors attempting to find that much coveted Archimedean place to stand
and from which to bring shared moral convictions to bear on our public
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practical reflections.
This charge, however, should be put aside in contemporary
discussions; for it eviscerates discourse of standards on both sides of the
debate. Opponents of contemporary PAS and VAE would need to make the
Nazi! accusation stick; proponents would need only to escape from the Nazi
shadows. Neither is enough; for neither is ultimately conclusive or convincing.
Just as some practice is not wrong merely because the Nazis did it or merely
because it will lead to what the Nazis did do, so also, no practice is justified
solely by the fact that the Nazis did not do it or because it will not lead to
what they did do.
Keeping the scare quotes on ‘euthanasia’ in the phrase ‘Nazi
“euthanasia”’ and putting the Nazi! accusation away, let us ask: first, what
general philosophical presuppositions does Nazi “euthanasia” share with PAS
and VAE as currently proposed for legalization in the U.S.? second, what
made Nazi “euthanasia” unique? third, what contemporary characteristics of
the U.S. would specify the philosophical presuppositions underlying PAS and
VAE?
The first general presupposition common to the practices in question is
the notion that there are certain lives that ought not to be lived, and, more
importantly, that the fact that those lives ought not to be lived partially
justifies homicide. Nazis spoke of a life being unworthy of life -lebensunwerten Lebens.iv This way of speaking indicates that the Nazis
regarded the subject, an individual human being, as not being worthy of the
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property of being alive. Contemporary advocates of PAS and VAE speak of
life, under certain conditions, as not worth living. They regard the individual
as having a property that is not worth having. Thus, the Nazis devalued the
subject who possessed life while contemporary advocates of PAS and VAE
question the value of the life possessed by the subject. In both cases the
inference is made that a life that ought not to be lived ought to be ended
actively.
This shared inference is itself significant. For from the position that a
life ought not to be lived, it need not follow that the life ought to be ended.
One might reasonably hold that some life ought not to be lived while not
holding that if such a life were being lived it ought to be ended. For example, a
mother of children whose lives are chronically punctuated by suffering might
reasonably choose not to have another child because she judges the life it
would have as a life that ought not to exist. Yet, she need not thereby be
committed to killing her children who are leading such lives. Thus, it is
significant that both the Nazis and contemporary proponents of PAS and VAE
assume that from the fact that a life ought not to exist, it follows that such a
life ought to be ended actively.
Nazi “euthanasia” and the practices of PAS and VAE offer homicide
as an answer to the question: what does one do with a life that ought not to
exist? This reveals another presupposition common to these positions.
Namely, that life itself cannot be trusted with life; that the body does not have
its own reasons of which reason is sometimes not aware. This judgment that
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the lives that ought not to be lived cannot be entrusted to nature nevertheless
relies on certain idealized views of nature in terms of which precisely which
lives those are can be discerned. That is, the lives that ought not to be lived are
determined in biological terms vis-à-vis ideals of health and human
flourishing.
The Nazi biological ideal was racist, the purity of the Aryan Volk.v
The Aryan race was all too human for the Nazis, as evidenced by what they
could regard only as its unsightly embarrassments to be gotten rid of: children
with hydrocephaly, microcephaly, or Down’s syndrome; adults with withered
legs, senility, or epilepsy. Thus, the Nazis made the judgment that a life was
not worth living in terms of and on behalf of a racist idealization of a
biologically purified Aryan Volk.
Contemporary proponents of PAS and VAE make the judgment that a
life is not worth living in terms of the physical qualities of that life.vi This is a
labile concept; nonetheless, amongst the proponents of PAS and VAE, there is
a consensus that certain conditions render life not worth living: a terminal
illness with intractable physical pain or a chronic progressively debilitating
disease.vii Thus, although they agree that the criteria grounding the judgment
that a life ought not to exist are generally biological, Nazis and contemporary
advocates of PAS and VAE base this judgment on different biological
standards.
More importantly, although Nazis and contemporary advocates in
principle agree that there are lives that ought not to be lived, the two groups
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offer distinct loci for giving this judgment authority. Contemporary advocates
hold that while all of us can make the judgment that a life is not worth living,
only the one living that life makes the judgment authoritatively. Thus,
contemporary advocates hope to insure that of those lives that are not worth
living -- for example, a life with an incurable progressively debilitating disease
-- only those judged to be not worth living by the one living the life will be
taken.viii
Nazis, on the other hand, were indifferent to whether or not the
individual or surrogate agreed with them that the life ought to be ended. It is
true that Hitler -- always the opportunist -- did begin the killing by responding
to the Knauer family’s request that a handicapped infant be killed,ix and the
Nazis did kill some children whose parents wanted them to be killed and some
adults whose spouses or children wanted them to be killed.x These killings,
however, were merely the inevitable coincidental agreements between state
and family that occur when upwards of seventy thousand people are killed.xi
Turning to the contemporary U.S., a number of factors will further
specify the general philosophical presuppositions grounding PAS and VAE.
The first concern the practical and public dynamics of the logic underlying
PAS and VAE. Most advocates of PAS and VAE want to keep the two
primary criteria of the justification together -- that the death be voluntary and
brought about for a good reason. These criteria, however, exist in tension with
one another -- as is evidenced by those soft paternalists who think that really
wanting to die is itself a sufficiently good reason for PAS or VAE.xii
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Moreover, these criteria face the perhaps peculiarly American dynamic by
which the legal develops from what people may do into what people do to
become what people ought to do. In the States, the legally permissible
becomes the norm which in turn becomes the socially obligatory. As patients
with terminal progressively debilitating diseases choose to kill themselves or
to be killed they establish a social norm. However, once this becomes the
social norm the burden of justification shifts to those who depart from it. As
the conviction takes publicly that others significantly like them were correctly
killed because they had a good reason to be killed and acknowledging this
asked to be assisted or to be killed, so also to that very extent the conviction
develops that some are not being reasonable in not wanting death. If the law
accepts these practices, it thereby undermines the autonomy of those who have
the same reasons to be killed but do not apprehend them as being good reasons
for being killed. Of course, some will find this description true to their own
experience of social norms and pressures while others will find it unduly
speculative. There is, however, another more practical exigency that will
particularize these practices in the States, namely, the phenomenon of
capitation.
Advocates of PAS and VAE tend to romanticize the compassionate
killing of those who want to be killed without sufficient reflection on the way
in which health care has come to be delivered and will continue to be
delivered in the States.xiii In a fee-for-service environment, a physician is paid
for the services she provides to her patients. Thus, she is tempted to do more
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in order to make more. In a capitated system, however, a physician is paid
more the less she does. Thus, her temptation changes from doing more to
doing less in order to make more. This is not to argue against capitation as a
means by which to control health care costs. Nonetheless, when introducing
PAS and VAE into a context in which capitation is becoming the standard and
health care costs are thought to be out of control, one must realize that
significant savings are to be had in convincing those who have become
expensive in terms of health care that death is one option for them. Significant
amounts of money could be made by killing the sickest patients, especially
those terminally ill who have no prospect of returning to work or to conditions
of health in which they would make net financial contributions to health care
costs. Once law legitimates killing those who judge their lives to be not worth
living, it legitimates making and saving money by killing those people. In
order to convince these individuals and their physicians, why not advertise,
promote or incentivize death as the therapy of choice? One would be innocent
of any knowledge of human motivation if one thought that the desire for gain
were not a significant and largely ungovernable factor facing the legalization
of PAS and VAE, particularly in the United States where medicine and health
insurance are large for-profit enterprises. As others have argued, one need not
reject PAS and VAE as unethical in order to reject the legalization of these
practices.xiv
Returning to the Nazi! accusation, one further reason becomes evident
for ridding ourselves of that charge in our discussions of PAS and VAE.
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Facing that accusation we may find ourselves confidently saying “that would
never happen here.” In this way the Nazi! accusation and the relatively easy
refutation of it console us, as if our greatest concern were that we not become
neo-Nazis. Our own specific temptations, however, require greater attention,
for they are much more ordinarily humane and human.
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